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Corporate Ideology And The Anomaly Of Dedicated Growth In New Orleans 
Corporate elites, as well as the general populace, frequently equate economic development 
with economic growth. Moreover, business and industrial leaders pursue growth almost 
indiscriminately, resulting in an ideological consensus (Whitt, 1982; Marcuse, 1982) which 
greatly constrains the ability of local governments to enact redistributive public policies. Local 
corporate and political leaders alike "use their growth consensus to eliminate any alternative 
vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community" (Logan & Molotoch, 
1987: 51). The hegemony of the "progrowth agenda" (Reed, 1988: 145) in many urban centers 
predates conservative economic policies advanced in the 1980's (Smith & Judd, 1984) but of 
late has been especially embraced by the New Right to promote the values of "property rights" at 
the expense of "person rights" (Apple, 1989: 34). 
The failure to distinguish between economic growth and economic development has led to 
the enactment of public policies which have had dire consequences for the underclass, those 
"truly disadvantaged" persons (Wilson, 1987) who seem to permanently inhabit impoverished 
inner cities. For example, in pursuit of economic growth, and in the name of market ideologies, 
the Reagan Administration reduced funding for low income housing by 75% (Jacob, 1988). The 
consequences of growth strategies (e.g., privatization) are well known nationally. Less clearly 
understood are those processes of social context--history, culture, and ideology (Beauregard, 
1984: 58-63), which enable actors to resist the domination tendency of the growth machine. An 
empirical study of local ideology in urban settings may, therefore, help document the ideological 
hegemony of the progrowth agenda. Smith (1980: 18) is worth quoting at length on this score. 
... research in urban studies would benefit from a close examination of the 
ideological, cultural, and socialization processes that determine how people in 
particular national and class settings come to define their 'interests,' (lliQI to 
the point where interests are either factored into politics or deflected from 
consideration. 
(emphasis added) 
New Orleans and the State of Louisiana provide interesting cases to document the hegemony 
of growth ideologies and politics. Historically, the state has maintained an anti-business stance 
owing to the legacy of Huey Long, who amassed enormous ower by paying for free textbooks, 
paving county roads, and--especially--helping to enact the homestead exemption during the 
depression years to protect homes and farms from foreclosures. Many of Long's populist policies 
were financed by taxes from the oil and gas industries. 
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In New Orleans, too, an entrenched social oligarchy prevented, up until very recently, 
capital investment and often blocked the financing of entrepreneurial small businessmen and 
women (Bobo 1975). Historically local business elites have been divided by "new" versus "old" 
money interests (Whalen & Young, 1989); the tensions between uneven development and the 
progrowth agenda are particularly acute1, and the hegemony of "property rights" (Apple, 
1989: 34) are ensconced institutionally in the state tax code and culturally in the ethos of 
historic preservation (Smith & Keller, 1983). As Smith and Keller (1983) assert, the ethos of 
preservation has historically placed ideological limits on growth. A widespread acceptance of 
growth ideologies, legitimized by the state, would therefore serve as powerful evidence to 
document the hegemony of growth forces. 
In this article I present a case study of "fiscal reform," a political ideology advanced by 
corporate elites in New Orleans and throughout the State of Louisiana to resolve the fiscal crisis 
currently experienced by state and local government. I use content analysis, supplemented by 
interviews, to study ideology within the framework of critical theory. Specifically, the paper 
focuses on the tension between corporate elites' attempts at installing a "corporate regime" 
(Stone, 1987; cited in Whalen & Young, 1989) through the use of political ideology and the 
resistance presented by middle class homeowners. The paper concludes with the prospects for 
corporate hegemony in New Orleans and the implications for the underclass to reap benefits from 
a growth strategy or, alternatively, to challenge the growth machine through politically 
organized social movements. 
A Critical Perspective of Ideology 
Critical theorists 2 (Habermas, 1971; Giroux, 1980; Apple, 1989) define ideology as 
the "production of sense and meaning" (McLaren, 1989: 177) and tie the function of ideology in 
capitalist societies to a theory of domination. Through the use of ideology, unequal power 
relations are institutionalized in the schools, churches. governmental agencies and corporate 
headquarters. Dominant ideologies, however, are resisted and may actually serve to give rise to 
"oppositional" ideologies (McLaren, 1989:178). Thus, dominant ideologies are never fixed; 
they are socially constructed and their continued dominance is a problematic function of the 
dialectical relationship between structure and human agency. 
I distinguish between two kinds of ideologies: hegemonic and political. Following 
McLaren (1989:174-176), hegemonic ideologies culturally "encase" meaning. Dominant 
groups work to seek the consent of subordinant groups, not by force or coercion, but by 
providing moral and intellectual leadership (Gramsci,1971). Such ideologies structure culture 
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and the subjective experience of meaning in a fashion that allows for a "common sense" 
worldview subscribed to by both dominant and subordinant groups. By contrast, corporate and 
political elites employ political ideologies to manipulate the citizenry into supporting specific 
policy proposals or to garner public support for candidates who are favorable to their economic 
interests. The purpose of this paper, then, is to document the relationship between the political 
ideology of fiscal reform and the ideological hegemony of growth within an attempt by corporate, 
governmental, and civic elites to consolidate a corporate regime in New Orleans in the late 
1980's. 
The Hindrances to Local Economic Growth 
Until the 1970's, New Orleans seemed insulated from the need to pursue aggressive 
economic development policies aimed at achieving a progrowth agenda. Decades of economic 
prosperity derived from profits in oil and gas industries, coupled with one of the country's most 
productive ports, and a healthy tourist industry all combined to lull to sleep the city's economic 
and political elites. Despite gloomy forecasts from public and private reports which warned of 
looming financial disaster, city government did little to ward off a declining revenue base and a 
dwindling tax base. New Orleans' revenue and fiscal problems were compounded by a tax 
structure which (enshrined in the state constitution) placed severe limits on the city's ability to 
raise taxes and by the homestead exemption (also contained in the state's constitution) which 
exempted from property taxes the first $75,000 of the assessed value of a home. Not 
insignificantly, city government was marked by a preponderance of independent and 
quasi-independent governmental bodies such as the Port of New Orleans, the Audubon Park 
Commission, the Tourist Commission, the Downtown Development District, and the Orleans 
Parish School Board--all of which greatly facilitated the development of a "caretaker regime" 
(Stone, 1987, cited in Whalen & Young, 1989; 2-4) and constrained fragmented attempts to 
introduce a corporate regime. The city's seven elected tax assessors underscored the politicized 
context of property tax assessment and made consensus-building for gubernatorial and corporate 
calls for tax reform difficult to achieve. 
This economic and legal framework combined to produce an anti-tax ideology among the 
city's middle class homeowners, 85% of whom were exempt from paying any property taxes 
(Bureau of Governmental Research, 1987), which prevented business from expanding and 
moving forward with economic growth. Business groups complained that they were shouldering 
the tax burden and that new businesses would locate to near-by states such as Mississippi and 
Tennessee, where the tax burden was smaller. A coalition of homeowners, anti-tax activists 
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and "New Right" fiscal conservatives successfully defeated several tax measures and service 
charges during the eight years of the Morial administration (1978-86) and in the early days of 
the succeeding Barthelemy term (Whalen & Young, 1989). Taxes of any kind, but especially 
property and income taxes, were very difficult to pass, thus, given the perceived corruption of 
the political system of taxation and the constitutional limits on individual property taxes. 
By the early 1980's the city's financial elite faced a double-edged sword: the collapse of 
the world oil market, which witnessed prices to below $10 per barrel, forced the virtual 
shutdown of the local oil industry and related service industries. Meanwhile the city was 
entering its worst financial crisis in its history, which resulted in a 1/3 reduction in its 
operating budget between 1984 and 1988. Business seemed caught in the middle: on the one hand 
the oil industry, which was virtually singlehandedly responsible for the revitalization of the 
Poydras Street corridor 3, was at a standstill; on the other hand, local government and the public 
schools were in dire need of additional revenues and were turning to the business community for 
support to raise business and franchise taxes, which corporate leaders had estimated to be 
already 69% higher than the southern average. From its vantage point, business could ill-afford 
to continue to foot the bill for the services of government. 
With the election of governor Buddy Roemer in 1987, business interests statewide, and in 
particular within the corporate oil community in New Orleans, had an ally upon whom they could 
hope to launch their campaign for reform of the state's political, economic, and educational 
system which they felt had led to "redlining" by national business leaders. Roemer, the reform 
candidate, was able to win over the state's major newspapers on the promise of integrity in 
government and politics and by accepting no campaign contributions over $1 ,000. In defeating 
former three-time governor and populist symbol Edwin Edwards, Roemer and his allies in the 
state's major corporations were poised to wage the ideological war against populism which would 
prove to the corporate community throughout the country and the entire world that Louisiana 
was a good state in which to do business. Several months prior to the gubernatorial election, a 
network of business, civic, and academic leaders began meeting in the offices of 
Freeport-McMoran, the major oil and gas producer in the city, to plan a political strategy for 
the enactment of tax reform. These planning meetings eventually produced a detailed 




The Ideology of Reform 
In March, 1987, James R. "Jim Bob" Moffett, chairman and chief executive officer of 
Freeport-McMoran Corporation (FMC), organized the Louisiana Council for Fiscal Reform 
(LCFR), ostensibly to rescue the state from financial ruin. The group, which consisted of major 
corporations in Louisiana which had contributed at least $5,000 to the drive for fiscal reform, 
comprised what journalists were describing as the "new civic leadership" consisting of the chief 
executives of corporations such as FMC, Coca-Cola, CNG (Consolidated Natural Gas), and 
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company--all directed by relative newcomers to the city. LCFR 
had evolved from a similar group Moffett had organized in New Orleans, the Business Council, 
consisting of fifty corporations which donated $20,000 annually to resolve the city's economic, 
educational and political problems. 
Bodenheimer (1970) asserts that historical ideological movements profess a mythology 
which political leaders take for historical fact, and to which they ask the masses to subscribe 
when seeking to mobilize society for change. As corporate advocates of change, Moffett and LCFR 
sought to dispel the myth of populism. At its core was an indictment of an ideology which dated 
from the era of Huey Long. It became clear in one of the first public meetings of the group held 
on March 9, that corporate leaders wanted action with respect to an overhaul of the state's tax 
structure. They had grown weary of the numerous studies whose detailed policy proposals had 
not been implemented. At that meeting LCFR chairman Moffett announced a "grassroots" attack on 
Louisiana populism, declaring that, "If you want to be on a sinking ship, then by golly vote for 
the status quo." (New Orleans Times-Picayune, 1988g:B-1). Moffett was referring to the 
Council's proposal to restructure the state's tax code, bringing the taxes paid by business in line 
with the southern average by shifting the tax burden from corporations to individual property 
and state income taxes. 
Seeking to debunk the myth of populism, LCFR's argument embraced the following 
elements: 
(1)	 Louisiana's populist legacy had deceived its citizens into believing that they could 
get something for nothing--the "Louisiana Hayride"--(see McGinnis, 1985) when 
in reality it was revenues derived from the oil and gas industries which permitted 
the state to enjoy periods of relative economic prosperity. 
(2)	 The welfare state, which was responsible for producing one of the most extensive 
indigent hospital networks in the country, had caused a bloated state government 
which was spending in excess of comparable-sized governments in the south (see 
Oakland, 1985). 
(3)	 No incremental approach on behalf of government would provide meaningful 
6
 
solutions to the state's chronic fiscal crisis. What was needed was fundamental 
change, what corporate leaders branded "fiscal reform." 
(4)	 Only through fiscal reform could the State expect to produce the necessary jobs and 
foster economic development to sustain the quality of life desired by its residents 
and reverse the outmigration experienced in the mid-1980's. 
Reformist ideology became a concrete legislative proposal when Roemer presented the 
Louisiana Council's Fiscal Reform package, with some slight modifications, for approval from 
the Louisiana Legislature in a special session held in Fall, 1988. The governor's legislative 
initiatives were crafted in the form of two separate constitutional amendments, each of which 
would eventually face ratification by the Louisiana electorate in a state-wide referendum. 
Roemer's staff characterized one bill, a one thousand page document, as the "largest, most 
comprehensive legislation" in the state's history. This legislation would rewrite the Louisiana 
tax code which enshrined the homestead exemption, the most generous in the country, in the 
state's 1974 constitution. The second bill was the enabling legislation which would provide the 
statutory framework to actually implement the rewritten tax code in all of the state's 64 
parishes. 
Briefly, the legislation at its core embraced three elements which business leaders in 
corporate offices in New Orleans and throughout the state contended would lift Louisiana out of 
the economic backwaters: 
(1)	 A reduction of the tax burden on business by repealing the corporate franchise tax, 
the inventory ad valorem tax, and the sales tax on equipment, machinery, and 
construction materials. Business leaders claimed that such taxes on business and 
industry were among the highest in the nation and the highest in the South (LCFR 
legislative program, 1988). 
(2)	 A reduction in the state's homestead exemption from $75,000 to $25,000. 
Reducing the state's homestead exemption would broaden the tax base which 
according to recent studies, excluded approximately 85% of the city's homeowners 
from paying any property taxes (Bureau of Governmental Research, 1987). 
(3)	 Lowering the state's sales tax and and increasing personal income tax. Economists 
and tax consultants to LCFR argued that the regressive sales tax (in New Orleans the 
sales tax at 9% is the highest in the country) not only hurt the poor. It would also 
cost the state approximately $160 million in lost revenue because sales taxes were 
no longer deductible under the provisions of the new federal tax law. 
Initially, as this article will detail below, the fiscal reform legislation would produce no 
new revenues, but would, instead, be "revenue neutral." Over the long term, however, LCFR 
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leaders claimed that the state's budget would be tied to growth income such as the personal 
income tax. By reducing the dependence on the oil industry by restructuring the tax system, the 
implication was that both state and local governments would benefit economically. A much fuller 
discussion of the ideological orientation underpinning these policy proposals will be provided in 
the balance of this paper. 
A Content Analysis of Local Corporate Ideology 
Seider's (1974) content analysis of corporate speechmaking suggests five ideological 
themes which may be applied to analyze local corporate ideology in New Orleans. These are: 
classical, nationalism, social responsibility, trustee, and professional. The classical theme 
represents "the main bulwark of the American business creed" (Sutton, quoted in Seider, 1974: 
807). Its major values stem from a belief in the marketplace--free enterprise, profit, and the 
internal regulating capacity of the capitalist economic system. Running ideologically counter to 
the classical belief in the market is the value of social responsibility. The managers' sense of the 
role business plays in the resolution of social problems, the formulation of social policy, and the 
philanthropic improvement of the community in general is emphasized. Seider notes that the 
value corporate elites place on social responsibility "would be recognized as a major goal of 
business, not as an incidental by-product of its day to day operations" (Seider, 1977: 808). 
The managerial role of business is stressed in the trustee theme. Here, corporate managers 
mediate between the interests of its clients/customers, stockholders, employees, the community 
and the public sector. 
Similarly, the professional ideological theme focuses upon the corporate manager's 
prerequisite skills and specialized technical expertise central to the efficient conduct of the 
corporation, business, or industry. Seider speculates that this theme stems from the 
development of "conglomerate ideology" where managers must learn to work with cohorts within 
and across companies. Finally, nationalistic ideology stresses love and loyalty of the nation, as 
opposed to a more narrow sectarian interest in the corporation. 
A few of Seider's categories can be dismissed as not relevant to the local "movement" for 
fiscal reform in New Orleans. First, nationalistic value preferences clearly do not apply; 
however, there is some sentiment of nationalistic fervor as it applies to the state of Louisiana. 
The LCFR's unswerving commitment to radical overhaul of the state's tax code, revenue sources, 
and decentralized delivery of social services demonstrates, symbolically at least, a universal 
8
 
interest in the welfare of the state as a whole. Of course, such rhetoric must be weighed against 
some very explicit motivations on behalf of corporations such as Moffett's Freeport-McMoran 
and others which would together net approximately $300 million in tax savings under the 
Roemer proposal (New Orleans Times-Picayune, 1988d:). 
The trustee theme has limitations to this study as well. Since LCFR, and the movement for 
fiscal reform, represented an attempt at unification and mobilization of the statewide corporate 
community, little, if any, discussion took place as to the interests of stockholders, customers, or 
other constituents of the group. Indeed, it was assumed that no mediation of such interests need 
occur, since several polls commissioned by the Moffett group indicated overwhelming support 
not only for the entire concept attendant legislative proposals, but also the group's commitment 
to organize a "grassroots" movement to lobby the legislature and the public for enactment 
(Chamber of Commerce, 1988). 
Similarly, the theme of corporate social responsibility, on surface, has limited 
application. This theme is more complex than the two mentioned above, however, in that it 
appears that some of the leaders of LCFR appeared genuinely concerned over the state's future 
financial health, in particular as to its ability to attract jobs for its citizenry. On March 13, 
1988, the secretary of the group wrote in an editorial to the Times Picayune, the state's largest 
newspaper: "Louisiana's excessive business taxes which impose harsh burdens upon new 
investment and existing businesses, are the primary cause of the state's economic problems" ... 
"We don't need any more studies. Now is the time for action" (New Orleans 
Times-Picayune,1988h: A-26). 
This activist posture is significant, given business' history of relative inactivity and the 
historical "Mardi Gras" attitude of its elites (Chai, 1971). This attitude may be characterized 
as "tied to a traditional ethos and social structure which directed (corporate elites) energies 
away from entrepreneurial economic activities" (Smith & Keller, 1983: 132) and a 
disinclination towards aggressive promotion of economic development and diversification of the 
local economy. Although this trend had softened somewhat during development of the Poydras 
Street corridor following construction of the Superdome in the 1970's (Whelan, 1988), local 
and corporate elites had remained fragmented in their approach to economic growth and, with 
some exceptions, apathetic to politics. Under Moffett's leadership, and the organizational 
support of the state's leading corporations, a political consensus on the solution to the state's 
economic problems was crafted, seemingly overnight. 
No longer content to sit idly watching the deterioration of the economy and the exodus of 
many of its residents--New Orleans experienced a net loss of 28,000 residents between 1987 
and 1988 (U. S. Census, 1988)--corporate elites apparently saw as their civic and social duty 
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to do something about the mammoth problems. An internal memorandum of the precursor to 
LCFR, the New Orleans Business Council, strikingly reveals the urgency that local business 
elites felt prior to the opening of the 1988 legislative session: "A tax package that does not 
address the concerns of New Orleans taxpayers will guarantee that further productive members 
of this economic community will move themselves and, in some instances their businesses, out of 
Orleans Parish...The state is screaming for a positive economic thrust, and the consensus you 
(Moffett) outline definitely points us in that direction" (Minutes of the New Orleans Business 
Council, 1987). Socially and economically, thus, the movement for fiscal reform among state 
and local corporate elites seemed partially driven by a sense of social responsibility, despite the 
obvious benefits which would be had by corporations and business in general if the movement 
were successful. 
It is within the professional and the classical themes that Seider's classification scheme 
appears most useful in the analysis of state and local corporate ideology. First, the theme of 
professionalism predominates throughout much of the language of the proposals and the 
strategies for their enactment by the legislature. LCFR's domination of technical language, 
information, and general understanding of the state's fiscal climate makes its leadership role one 
of professional control in comparison to mass-based social movements which conventionally 
stress a layman's understanding of socially complex phenomena. In its use of technical language, 
for instance, the group sought to mold public opinion behind a complex realignment of the state's 
tax code by masking some controversial positions. Fiscal reform, on balance, was promoted in 
the group's official publications and internal working documents as "revenue neutral" (LCFR 
Legislative Program), meaning that while the state's tax system would be restructured, no new 
monies to state and local government would result because additional local taxes would occur 
under its proposal only with a vote of the people and any increase in property taxes resulting 
from a lowering of the homestead exemption would be accompanied by a mandatory millage 
"rollback" to a lower tax rate. In reality, as journalists obseNed, many citizens would pay 
higher taxes, and the state over the years would experience a growth in revenues as income taxes 
expanded. 
The term fiscal reform itself symbolized technical control over the political debate. Most 
Louisiana citizens were somewhat aware of the state's financial condition at the start of the 1988 
legislative session; but few had a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the complex 
interrelationships among taxes, revenues, and expenditures which combined to produce the 
state's fiscal portfolio. Moreover, the organization's insistence on the acceptance of the package 
as a whole, given the vulnerable interdependence of its components--repealing the corporate 
inventory and franchise taxes meant an increase in the state income tax--virtually guaranteed 
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that less knowledgeable supporters of fiscal reform had to support the concept in its entirety or 
face the risk of embarrassment owing to a lack of understanding. In several public forums on the 
tax reform issue, the university-based economic consultants to LCFR consistently stressed the 
interdependent nature of the reform package--and the need for the citizenry to accept its 
component parts in their entirety (Metropolitan Area Committee, 1987). Control over the 
language implied dominance over the parameters of the issue and ideological structuring of the 
discussion in "growth" versus "no growth" terms. 
Perhaps the most obvious symbol of technicaVprofessional control of language lay in the 
group's use of the term "economic development." The economic arguments advanced by corporate 
elites were such that in order to attract business and industry to the state to provide the jobs 
desired by its residents, taxes on businesses had to be significantly lowered and the burden 
shifted to the middle classes, chiefly homeowners who experienced the lowest property taxes in 
the country (the sales tax which negatively affected the poor was to be lowered). As similar 
efforts in other localities by business to advance progrowth agendas (see Stone,1976 ), no 
mention was made of structural causes mirrored in the shift to an information and service-
oriented economy; and, of course, no consideration given as to alternatives to the control of the 
economic system, which might lead to some redistributive benefits to the lower classes. 
Economic development was synonymous with economic growth for business, with the middle 
classes in Louisiana largely absorbing the additional tax burden (New Orleans 
Times-Picayune,1988b: A-4). 
Lastly, the control over information, typical of corporate cultures and bureaucracies in 
general (Peterson, 1979; Deal & Kennedy, 1983), was vividly illustrated by the small group of 
economists and attorneys who produced the complex tax package and by the largely secretive 
manner in which the legislative strategy was developed (see Minutes of New Orleans Business 
Council,1987). Two economists working with the group drafted the tax package which 
ultimately led to the massive legislative document (1,000 pages). An economist from Louisiana 
State University and another from the University of New Orleans conducted the economic 
analyses which framed the constitutional amendment and the enabling legislation. Even the 
legislative allies of Governor Roemer, floorleaders and chairmen of key committees, complained 
that they "had no playbook." 
Aside from the political strategy of withholding information up to the last possible minute 
(the Legislature as a full body did not receive the complete document until less than one month 
prior to the opening of the special session) the corporate practices of monopoly of information 
and closed-door strategy sessions signal the emerging ideological consensus among corporate 
elites for fiscal reform and for the unification of their interests. Corporate elites would employ 
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a strategy of secrecy to break-up what they perceived as the logjams preventing economic 
growth and, concretely, as a threat to their very livelihood, given the poor outlook for the state 
economy and the unlikelihood that the oil industry could survive if it sustained any further 
losses. This tight grip over information and technical control over the language of fiscal reform 
stemmed directly from the corporate elites' classical ideological orientation towards the value of 
"free enterprise;" and what I shall call the "privatization" ethos towards government and the 
public sector. I propose an additional category of "privatization" to Seider's classical theme, 
which I suggest describes the unique ideological orientation of New Orleans' 
corporate elites, but which may accurately describe the national system of beliefs, values, and 
attitudes towards the public sector during the Republican administration of the 1980's. 
As Seider's 1974 study articulates, the classical theme embodies interrelated "core 
values" (Deal & Kennedy, 1982) of corporate cultures including profit, a belief in the 
unregulated free enterprise system, and in the power of the market to provide the economic 
needs of society. Within fiscal reform the data suggests a division into two sub-categories: 
business expansion and entrepreneurism. In the campaign for fiscal reform prior to the election 
of Buddy Roemer, and in the special legislative session held less than a year after he was elected, 
lCFR succeeded in building a consensus on the need to allow business to expand in louisiana. 
Indeed, corporate elites could point to some very strong evidence to buttress their arguments 
that the fundamental cause of the state's economic problems was the excessive tax burden carried 
by business in proportion to taxes paid by individuals, especially property taxes. For example, 
a study commissioned by CABl (Council for a Better louisiana) established that in louisiana 
"businesses pay $300 million more in taxes than they receive in benefits" (New Orleans 
Times-Picayune, 1988h:). Most strikingly, lCFR could point to the loss of 170,000 jobs 
louisiana experienced between 1981 and 1988 (Wolf, cited in City Business, 1988: 7). 
Thus, virtually no one questioned the need to expand business in louisiana. One state 
representative, Sherman Copelin, a leader in the legislative Black Caucus, did seek to introduce 
an amendment to the constitution tying a reduction in business taxes to the actual percentage of 
new jobs created. Further, some legislators, mainly those from rural or suburban districts who 
were opposed to the reduction in the homestead exemption, complained that business was seeking 
a $300 million tax break on the "promise" of job creation (louisiana legislative Record, 
1988); but in general there was little questioning of the role business was to play in economic 
growth. The state's economy was simply in too bad a shape. Perhaps the most powerful evidence 
of the consensus behind business expansion was the overwhelming support (70%) given by 
black legislators who saw in fiscal reform a chance to lower the sales taxes and an opportunity to 
spread the tax load, perhaps in the long-term assistance of local government whose constituents 
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in New Orleans were the poor and minorities. Concretely, elected black officials viewed the 
lowering of the homestead exemption as a chance to equalize the tax burden on their constituents, 
many of whom were paying commercial property taxes via higher rents. 
LCFR argued that without business expansion, Louisiana could not compete economically 
with its neighbor states in the southeast region whose tax burden was considerably less. It 
pointed, for example, to threats by industrial firms such as Trinity Machine Group, which was 
threatening to move its headquarters from New Orleans to near-by Gulfport, Mississippi, where 
the taxes on business and industry were lower. Corporate elites argued that not only would the 
private sector be unable to expand job opportunities if fiscal reform failed; the state would soon 
begin to witness an erosion of the companies which were already located here. Those 
corporations which stood to lose the most from a failure to restructure the state's 
taxes--Fortune 500 oil firms such as Moffett's Freeport-McMoran and CNG, a natural gas 
company whose regional headquarters was in New Orleans--ironically were those which had the 
financial and organizational resources to withstand the fiscal status quo over the longest period of 
time. 
Finally, the spirit of entrepreneurism especially characterized the leadership style of 
corporate elites in New Orleans and in Louisiana during the push for fiscal reform. When 
Moffett first moved his entire headquarters and consolidated his operations in one attractive 
building on Poydras Street in New Orleans in 1985, he moved quickly to unify the corporate 
community, which had historically been divided along "old" versus "new" money interests in the 
city. He founded the Business Council, which as described above consisted of the fifty most 
powerful chief executive officers of major corporations in New Orleans such as Tidewater, Lykes 
Steamship, and Price Waterhouse (Minutes of Business Council, 1985). The Business Council 
moved to provide financial and political support behind the development of the riverfront in the 
form of a proposal to establish the "Aquarium of the Americas," a $15 million private/public 
"partnership" which would anchor tourist-related development along the river; the construction 
project was bitterly opposed by some French Quarter preservationist groups, 
but--significantly--supported by the Vieux Carre Commission and by virtually all of the city's 
political, financial, and civic elites. Moffett and other corporate elites in LCFR, such as the 
regional president of Coca-Cola, carried the same enthusiasm for unification and activism in the 
drive for fiscal reform. 
These new wave of civic leaders possessed a penchant for quick decision-making and 
optimism which was legendary. This attitude mirrors the "entrepreneurial" spirit. Moreover, 
these corporate elites, as Whitt (1982;1984) and Seider (1974) observe seem "united in 
(their) fundamental interests" (Whitt, 1982:181) and possessed the ability to brush aside 
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internal conflicts. It has been already described above how the entire complex reform package 
was put together, first in the corporate offices of Freeport-McMoran, and secondly, in the 
governor's office in Baton Rouge, in a period of a few months. This point cannot be 
overemphasized. 
Prior to the arrival of out-of-town oil magnates and wildcatters such as Patrick Taylor, a 
wealthy Republican who had connections to the White House, the climate of enterprise consisted 
of a laissez-faire attitude, which stemmed from an upper class whose fortunes derived from 
inherited wealth and property. Many residents of affluent "uptown" New Orleans successfully 
defeated businesses from locating in their neighborhoods applying a preservationists ethos which 
gained strict zoning regulations, such as control of small "bread and breakfast" business. Local 
business elites in New Orleans historically looked neither to the state for fiscal and regulatory 
relief, nor sought to expand their financial horizons independently in the market. All of this 
changed with the Business Council and LCFR. 
The Privatization of the Public Interest 
The ideology of fiscal reform extends beyond the classical doctrine identified by Seider in 
his study of the executive speeches of national business elites. In New Orleans, and throughout 
the State, the fiscal reform "movement" demonstrated a political culture marked by a seeming 
repugnance and contradictory attitudes towards government which I term thQ ethos of 
"privatization." At its core the privatization ideology is characterized in New Orleans by a 
preponderance of volunteers in government, the proliferation of private-public 
"partnerships"; and the contracting of private companies for city services. Ultimately, 
privatization gives legitimacy to profit. When local government can no longer maintain these 
conventional services, and is "forced" to contract out to the private sector or, as is the case in 
New Orleans, to rely increasingly on volunteerism, profits increase and the accumulation 
process resumes, all apparently quite smoothly and "organically," as Marcuse (1981: 330) 
observes. Locally, this ethos dominates because of the historically entrenched upper class whose 
ownership of property in a city where land is very scarce (Whelan, 1988) virtually guaranteed 
private ownership of the means of production and because of an equally historically underfunded 
city government whose revenue base had substantially declined in the 1980's (see Ryan, 1988). 
These historical cultural conditions provide the context for consensus building around fiscal 
reform among corporate and government elites and at once lay political ground for its 
compromise among voters. I return to this paradox in the conclusion of the paper. 
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I would argue that this same ethos which pervades public sector attitudes in New Orleans 
can also be found throughout the nation. Cities face significant fiscal and social stresses. Caught 
in a "double bind", local governmental officials have little choice but to succumb to the growth 
alternative (Peterson, 1982; Reed, 1988); but doing so requires additional capital and 
infrastructure needs. As cities struggle to meet the requirements of growth, less capital is 
available to meet essential human needs. In the context of the economic restructuring of cities, 
as Smith and Keller (1983); Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) and others have shown, the role 
played by business has been one of providing a catalytic effect on redevelopment efforts. In 
brief, as cities grow more dependent on private capital for a percentage of operating funds and 
services, owing to the economic decline in urban centers, privatization tendencies increase 
proportionally. 
As Whitt (1982) observes, while production becomes increasingly "social in character", 
profit remains essentially private (1988:191). Because the public sector is constrained in its 
abilities to raise revenues (see Peterson, 1981: 3-17), and is therefore required to promote 
"developmental" policies, it assumes the role of providing the infrastructure for local industry 
to function and expand, while unable to capitalize on the economic benefits (see O'Connor, 
1973). The historical laissez-faire attitude towards the public sector in New Orleans, 
moreover, in harsh economic times means that the city is increasingly unable to attend to the 
public interest, broadly defined as those values, policies, and programs which fulfill the 
"common good", (Warren, 1988 cited in Vogel & Swanson, 1989). It is in this sense, then, that 
private interests now define the broad public interest in urban centers. 
Conclusion 
The Louisiana Legislature and the electorate ultimately rejected several variations of 
fiscal reform in the first two years of the Roemer administration. The most comprehensive 
version, and the most controversial, the LCFR package, was rejected by the legislature; the 
other two variants, one enacting an increased state income tax, the other calling for a "dedicated" 
tax to finance infrastructure improvements, were both offered to the voters in constitutional 
amendments. The first failed by substantial amounts; the second passed overwhelmingly. What 
accounts for the failure of fiscal reform and, conversely, for the passage of the transportation 
amendment? 4 (Amendment provided $1.5 billion in infrastructure improvements state-wide, 
and $400 million to New Orleans alone, coupled with a projected creation of 11,000 
construction jobs for the city). 
1 5 
Whalen and Young (1989) suggest that the lack of strong governmental leadership in New 
Orleans, owing to "caretaker" politics in the city administration, is the cause of the defeat of tax 
measures locally (and by implication, statewide). Put simply, fiscal reform, as a political 
ideology designed to build coalitions with labor, blacks, and the working class, did not attract the 
very people it was designed to assist with the promise of job creation--under or unemployed 
minorities and blue collar workers. Indeed, among blacks, blue collar workers, and the poor, 
fiscal reform attracted less than 50% of the vote (New vork Times, 1989: Y 26) in Orleans 
Parish and even less in the more affluent areas. Thus despite its widespread appeal to corporate 
and political elites, as a political strategy, fiscal reform fell short. 
But this explanation is too simple. Why were the Moffett group and others successful in 
garnering sufficient public support for redevelopment plans such as the Aquarium and the 
transportation amendment but failed so badly on tax reform? On the ideological level business 
elites helped create an anti-tax sentiment among voters; and the state's homestead exemption 
dating to the Long era makes the protection of "property rights" (Apple, 1989) sacrosanct in the 
state among middle class homeowners. 
The legislators' constituents perceived the "revenue neutral" policies of LCFR as a tax 
increase, paid for by middle class homeowners, to benefit large corporations, such as Moffett's 
Freeport-McMoran. This most controversial measure failed to win legislative approval. More 
pointedly, the income proposal (which did gain legislative approval) was proposed as a modest 
increase in state income taxes, the bulk of which would fall on the upper middle class. However, 
LCFR backers could not convince the electorate that a tax increase to benefit large corporations 
would actually result in a net gain in jobs. 
It's difficult to imagine that the corporate community, in the near future, can muster the 
support necessary to eliminate the "sacred icon," (Gill, 1989, B-9) the homestead exemption, 
which is enshrined in the constitution. However, the use of political ideology has limitations as a 
coalition strategy for any major tax increase measure. As an explanation for the defeat of tax 
reform in Louisiana it is also inadequate. The most adequate explanation is that the competing 
ideological hegemony of the protection of property serves the interests of the city's active middle 
class homeowners in resisting any kind of significant tax increases to support economic 
development. For these tax-shielded residents, the question remains development for whom and 
for what purpose? Evidence suggests that the consequences of uneven development in New 
Orleans (Smith & Keller, 1984; Mumphrey & Moomau, 1984) are such that the city's 
shrinking, but vocal, middle class is well secured in private police security, private and 
parochial schools, and affluent volunteer city landscapers. When it comes to a question of 
supporting taxes to sustain and improve city and state governmental services, therefore, the 
1 6
 
competing ideology of property protection effectively forestalls the consolidation of growth 
politics in New Orleans with the few exceptions of riverfront redevelopment, which the 
transportation amendment would help underwrite with infrastructure improvements. 
In the latter case (transportation improvements, the Aquarium, the Convention Center, 
etc), the use of private-public "partnerships" (see Reed, 1989: ) ideology, the perceived real 
benefits to the middle class family interests, and the donation of several million dollars in 
private and public funds all combine to secure passage of the minor tax increases. All of these 
projects carried the tag of "dedicated taxes," which meant that, at least on the ballot, monies 
generated from these taxes would be protected in a trust fund, thereby preventing "honest graft" 
from recurring 5. Significantly, the fledgling corporate regime had seized control of 
independent governmental bodies such as the Audubon Park Commission, the Port Authority, and 
the Tourist Commission by capturing majority representation on its boards and by hiring 
"bureaucratic entrepreneurs" (see Whalen & Young, 1989: 27-30) to manage and protect its 
economic and political interests. This protection was assured prior to the formulation of public 
policies by the state, and with little or no discussion by disenfranchised groups6. 
Unlike many urban centers which witnessed the consolidation of growth machine politics 
to spur urban renewal and redevelopment (cf, Stone, 1985; Fainstein & Fainstein, et ai, 1984; 
Swanstrom, 1986), "dedicated growth" best characterizes New Orleans. Growth occurs most 
prominently in those sectors (for example, tourism, transportation, and historic renovation) 
where corporate elites have been able to seize control of quasi-independent governmental 
agencies and successfully pursued public-private partnership strategies to co-opt "public 
policy and resources for the risk management functions" of the private sector (Reed, 1988: 
165). New Orleans, therefore, continues to remain an anomaly within the urban legacy of the 
growth machine. It is the unique culture of the city and state, however, that constrains the 
hegemonic goals of corporate elites, rather than more specific lack of "leadership" and poor 
coalition-building skills. The findings of this study suggest that the competing ideologies of 
property rights make the prospects for coalition-building in support of comprehensive growth 
policies a very uncertain enterprise. 
Finally, the underclass is eliminated from this ideological equation. In New Orleans, the 
interests of the poor, in securing more and better low income housing, in obtaining improved 
public education, in winning well-paying jobs, is not served well either by growth or property 
rights ideologies. The tax reductions presented in the LCFR package, for instance, were designed 
to primarily benefit large corporations, with some relief for the poor through a lower sales tax. 
Continuation of the homestead exemption to protect middle income homeowners dramatically 
hurts the underclass as less revenues are available for governmental services (the total loss to 
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the City of New Orleans is estimated to be approximately $53 million). With the odds of 
effective political organizing increasingly against them (see Piven & Cloward, 1977; also, 
Fainstein & Fainstein, 1989), the inner city poor in New Orleans have little voice in the 





1.	 I am indebted to Ron King, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, for this 
notion. 
2.	 Although critical theory does not constitute a unified body of thought, I generally refer to 
the work associated with the "Frankfurt SchooL" According to Giroux, (1982b:8) "the 
Frankfurt School took as one of its central values a commitment to penetrate the world of 
objective appearances to expose the underlying social relationships they often conceal." 
3.	 Robert Whalen (1989:5) asserts that "the opening of the Louisiana Superdome had a 
catalytic effect on tourism (as it did on downtown office space)." For instance, the number 
of hotel rooms rose from 10,000 to 20,000 between 1970 and 1980. 
4.	 The transportation amendment would provide $1.5 billion in infrastructure 
improvements state-wide and $400 million to the City of New Orleans in support of 
construction activities at the Port of New Orleans, New Orleans International Airport and 
various highway projects. 
5.	 Donald Mintz, speech before the Executive Club of New Orleans, September, 1989. 
6.	 Interview with Timothy P. Ryan before the Metropolitan Area Committee's Financing the 
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